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Abstract 
This article examines the relevance of the Normative Power EU hypothesis by 
taking the EU’s responses in the face of the Eurozone crisis as an empirical case, a lit-
mus test for the EU’s normativity claims. Based on a critical, systematic investigation 
of the EU/IMF financial assistance programmes provided to crisis-hit members, this 
study argues that neoliberalism embedded in the EU has reached a new stage and has 
become equipped with very elaborate surveillance and coercion mechanisms. After a 
five year long disappointing history of neoliberal austerity, serious questions of demo-
cratic accountability, solidarity, and deliberative democracy have been raised. Today, 
the EU is not convincing in its claim to challenge deregulated globalisation and the 
Normative Power EU argument seems more and more contested than ever. 
Keywords: EU’s international identity, Eurozone crisis, disciplinary neoliber-
alism, normative power.
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AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ NORMATİF BİR GÜÇ MÜDÜR?  
AVRO BÖLGESİ KRİZİNİN ARDINDAN BİR DEĞERLENDİRME 
Özet 
Bu makale Avrupa Birliği’nin uluslararası sistemde bir ‘normatif güç’ olarak 
konumlandığı iddiasını Avro Bölgesi krizi bağlamında yeniden değerlendirmektedir. 
Bu amaçla çalışmada, krizdeki Avro Bölgesi üyelerine yönelik olarak AB ve IMF tara-
fından yürütülen finansal yardım ve kurtarma programları sistematik olarak, eleştirel 
biçimde incelenmektedir. Makalede, Avro krizinin ardından gerçekleştirilen reform-
larla birlikte AB’de neoliberalizmin yeni bir aşamaya taşındığı ve daha gelişmiş gö-
zetim, yaptırım ve baskı mekanizmalarıyla donatıldığı savunulmaktadır. Neoliberal 
reform ve kemer sıkma politikalarıyla geçen beş yıl AB’yi, demokratik hesap verebi-
lirlik, dayanışma ve müzakereci demokrasi konularında ciddi sorunlarla karşı karşıya 
bırakmıştır. Bu gelişmeler AB’nin uluslararası sistemde kendi norm, değer ve prensip-
lerini yaymaya muktedir bir ‘normatif güç’ veya ‘norm koyucu’ aktör olduğu iddiasını 
bugün her zamankinden daha da tartışmalı hale getirmiştir. 
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1. Introduction
In his neo-Gramscian analysis of European integration, Stephen Gill analyses 
the neoliberal governance in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
from a historical-materialist perspective and explains how the ‘new constitutionalism’ 
and accompanying power structures served the institutionalization of ‘disciplinary 
neoliberalism’ in Europe.1 The present study maintains that the recent restructuring 
of the economic governance in the European Union (EU), following the onset of the 
Greek debt crisis in May 2010, and throughout the euro area crisis, represents a quan-
tum leap from ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ to ‘coercive neoliberalism’, accomplished 
by politico-legal means, and hegemonic discursive practices; hastily, and without any 
search for a sufficient consensus among European citizens. The EU’s institutional 
and legal responses to the financial turmoil in the euro area, as well as the design of 
the EU/IMF assistance programmes provided to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cy-
prus, all reveal that neoliberalism embedded in the EU has reached a new stage, and 
become equipped with very elaborate surveillance and coercion mechanisms. The 
new economic governance of the Eurozone is capable of restraining the fundamental 
rights of EU citizens, constraining policy space of EU governments, and undermining 
the possibility of democratic contestation of economic policies even further, and in a 
more effective way. The ‘new constitutionalism’, which has been operative since the 
Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union was 
highly instrumental in the construction of a new, more coercive neoliberal economic 
governance in the euro area from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to the 
‘Six-Pack’ and the ‘Fiscal Compact’. However, in addition to constitutionalism and 
modifications in ‘hard law’, the EU has also developed new, innovative methods based 
on informal governance, inter-governmentalism and ‘soft law’, by means of which 
novel coercion and surveillance mechanisms are designed and successfully imposed. 
In all these recent developments, a transnational capitalist coalition has been playing 
an active leadership role in search of more efficient, more direct neoliberal gover-
nance and control mechanisms to protect the interests of capital, at the expense of the 
vested interests of labour. 
What are the implications of this emerging mode of ‘coercive neoliberalism’ 
for the EU’s ideational features, its international identity, and particularly, for the con-
ceptualization of the ‘Normative Power EU’ (NPEU)? Can we still regard the EU 
1 Stephen Gill, “European governance and new constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary 
Union and alternatives to disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe”, New Political Economy, 
3(1), 1998, pp. 5-26. Disciplinary neoliberalism is “a discourse of political economy that 
promotes the power of capital through extension and deepening of market values and dis-
ciplines in social life, under a regime of free enterprise”. Stephen Gill, “Constitutionalizing 
Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations”, International Studies Review, 4(2), 2002, 
p. 47. New constitutionalism can then be defined as the political-legal counterpart to dis-
ciplinary neoliberalism, which “legitimates and locks in the power gains of the propertied 
(capital) by constitutional amendment, international agreements or other juridical-political 
means”. Gill, “Constitutionalizing Inequality”, p. 60. See also Stephen Gill, “Globalizati-
on, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism,” Millennium-Journal of Inter-
national Studies, 24(3), 1995, pp. 399-423.
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as ‘a normative power’, whose actions are guided by a particular set of ‘European’ 
or ‘Cosmopolitan’ norms and values? To what extent is the EU capable of defining 
‘what passes for normal in world politics’, with the power to change norms, standards 
and prescriptions? The EU’s recent economic restructuring and responses to the Euro 
crisis necessitate a critical examination of the concept of normative power Europe, 
which has become an almost self-assertive argument. Not only the design, the essence 
and the structure of the financial assistance programmes but also the way they are 
enforced and implemented, reflecting neoliberal priorities have strong implications 
for the NPEU argument. The aim of this article is to illustrate the impact of the EU 
responses to the debt crisis for the NPEU argument. 
By taking the EU’s responses in the face of the Eurozone crisis as an empir-
ical case, a litmus test for the EU’s normativity claims, this article examines recent 
reforms in the EU’s economic governance, and neoliberal policies forced onto the 
EU’s crisis countries in an attempt to provide answers to the above-stated questions 
and assess the relevance of the normative power EU hypothesis. More specifically, 
this study undertakes a critical, systematic investigation of the euro area financial 
assistance programmes, studying the official texts and documents such as the Letters 
of Intent, the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and the Memoran-
dums of Understanding upon which these programmes are based. In addition to these 
documents signed by Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus, and submitted to the 
relevant EU institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), this study is also 
informed by publications of these institutions involved in the assistance programmes, 
as well as reports by the European Parliament, other EU institutions and European 
non-governmental organisations. 
Based on this empirically-oriented, critical analysis of the EU’s responses to 
the Eurozone crisis, this study contends that disciplinary market forces, along with 
the coercive new constitutionalism, brought the EU to a normative standstill. The fact 
that the EU included core norms, values and principles in its constitutive Treaties, 
legal order and policy discourses, long before the present crisis, does not necessarily 
mean that it applies them accurately, or acts in a normative way, in an ethically good 
manner.2 Despite the core norms, rules and principles upon which the EU’s normative 
power and international identity are assumed to rest are already there, firmly grounded 
in the acquis communautaire; it was hardly these particular norms embodied in these 
texts that guided the EU’s actions during the present episode of crisis. The making 
of the austerity programmes imposed on the crisis-hit euro area countries, and the 
way neoliberal coercion is inflicted do not fit well with the claim that the EU’s pow-
er relies primarily on non-coercive means and “works through ideas, opinions, and 
conscience”.3 Recent developments, particularly the EU’s insistence on promoting 
coercive neoliberalism have also significantly weakened the argument that the EU 
as an actor has a distinctive ability to change “the norms, standards and prescrip-
2 See Ian Manners, “The normative ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, 
84(1), 2008, p. 45.
3 Thomas Diez and Ian Manners, “Reflecting on Normative Power Europe”, in F. Berenskoet-
ter, & M. J. Williams (Eds.), Power in World Politics, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 175.
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tions of world politics”.4 This study argues that when the EU/IMF financial assistance 
programmes are critically scrutinized, it becomes more than clear that they have re-
produced well-known neoliberal policy prescriptions emanating from the Washing-
ton-based international financial institutions. Instead of shaping the conceptions of 
normal, therefore, the EU took for granted the hegemonic discourses of the ‘primacy 
of market’, or ‘competitiveness’, and the ‘efficiency at all costs’ rhetoric, and chose 
to promote dominant neoliberal policy prescriptions as normal. This not only under-
mines the EU’s normative power, or actorness capacity, but also gives a coup de grâce 
to the claims that the EU offers an alternative to deregulated, or ‘savage’ globaliza-
tion, in the form of a European ‘socially responsible’ or ‘managed’ globalization, and 
a shelter for its Member States, against American-style capitalism. 
The next section reviews the concept of Normative Power, sketches some of 
the core claims of the NPEU argument, placing the emphasis on the EU’s normative 
basis and principles as suggested in the relevant literature. The third section of the ar-
ticle provides an overview of the EU’s responses to the Eurozone crisis, from the new 
institutional framework to the legislative changes in the EU economic governance. 
This section also analyses the implications of these developments for the NPEU argu-
ment, identifying challenges that the EU’s fervent adoption of the neoliberal policies 
brings to its normative basis and principles. The fourth section investigates the spe-
cific economic policy conditionality regime of the EU/IMF assistance programmes, 
questioning to what extent the values, norms and principles promoted remain in com-
pliance with the core norms, values and principles upon which normative power EU 
argument is based. 
2. Normative basis of the EU 
Although there were many attempts to conceptualize the nature of the EU and 
the ideational features of EU politics in international relations, it was mainly after 
Ian Manners’ highly-cited, path-breaking article on the concept of Normative Power 
Europe published in 2002 that the academic interest has become more and more oc-
cupied with the ideations, values, principles and norms that inform EU policies and 
legitimize EU actions. Since then, the claim that the EU is a normative power has been 
increasingly revisited by International Relations (IR) scholars with the aim of evaluat-
ing the validity of the argument. Manners has described the EU as a normative power 
and claimed that the EU “exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and 
that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way”.5 The norma-
tive power of the EU comes through “a commitment to placing universal norms and 
principles at the centre of its relations with its member states and the world”.6 This 
gives the EU a unique, distinct international identity, not comparable to any other ac-
4 Manners, “The normative ethics”, p. 45.
5 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 40(2), 2002, p. 242.
6 Ian Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35(1), 2006, p. 176.
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tor in international politics. In this context Manners has argued that the central feature 
today defining the international identity of the Union “is not what it does or what it 
says, but what it is”.7 In this view, the EU is understood as also representing a cosmo-
politan polity, which adheres to, and is capable of promoting, a set of particular norms 
and values in world politics, “because of its particular historical evolution, its hybrid 
polity, and its constitutional configuration”.8
This formulation of the EU as a normative power has long been endorsed as 
a salient component of the EU’s international role in both the academic and official 
discourse.9 Manners identifies the core ‘European’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ norms as peace, 
liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, with ‘minor’ norms of 
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance, 
which all together constitute the EU’s normative basis.10 Standing on normative eth-
ics, Manners further developed these nine norms -- normative principles constitutive 
of the EU -- which define the aims and objectives of the EU in world politics, and 
guide its actions (see Table 1).11 
Table 1. The Normative Principles of the EU
The EU’s normative basis 
(Manners, 2002)
The EU’s normative principles 
(Manners, 2008)
- Core Norms -
Peace Sustainable peace
Liberty Social freedom
Democracy Consensual democracy
Respect for human rights Associative human rights
Rule of law Supranational rule of law
- Minor Norms -
Social solidarity Social solidarity
Anti-discrimination Inclusive equality
Sustainable development Sustainable development
Good governance Good governance
7 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 252.
8 Ibid., p. 252.
9 Elisabeth De Zutter, “Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological ap-
praisal”, Journal of European Public Policy, 17(8), 2010, p. 1106; Diez and Manners, 
“Reflecting on Normative Power Europe”, p. 176.
10 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 242.
11 Manners, “The normative ethics”, pp. 45-60. 
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The EU constructs its global leadership role, power and “greater legitimacy”12 
through these fundamental norms which have been inserted firmly into the main legal 
documents, EU Law and treaties such as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU or the Lisbon Treaty. The EU exercises its 
normative power through diplomatic means and the use of soft power only, without 
any recourse to coercion, economic or military; and the distinctively European, or 
Cosmopolitan values, norms and principles diffuse through contagion, transference, 
informational or procedural diffusion and cultural filter.13 In the view of the propo-
nents of the NPEU hypothesis, this is almost an innate right and a destiny, as Manners 
states confidently, “The EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in 
world politics”.14 The normative dimension of the EU thus also corresponds to a form 
of ‘ideological power’ which enables the EU “to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in 
international relations”.15 
The EU’s normative power crucially depends on the full respect of and com-
mitment to these norms and principles in both its internal and external relations. The 
credibility of the EU as a normative power does not rely solely on its external relations 
with the third parties but also on the nature of its relations with its member states. 
In order to assess the empirical relevance of the NPEU argument therefore, it is not 
satisfactory to only consider the EU’s foreign policy or external relations with the 
third countries. The EU’s relations with its member countries should also critically 
be addressed. It is important that in its relations with the member countries, the EU 
has been acting in accordance to the normativity claims particularly in the areas such 
as social rights and freedoms, equality, solidarity and non-discriminations. Otherwise 
claims about the EU as a normative power are nothing but “just cheap talk”.16
Another substantial indicator of normative power is to act in accordance with 
legal principles, self-binding through law, “a system of action that makes it possible 
to implement moral duties or commitments”. 17 The cosmopolitan nature of this con-
ceptualization of the EU’s international identity also requires normative power to be 
exercised credibly and consistently; truth conditions of this identity claim residing 
on “consistency between internal policies and external prescriptions and actions”.18 
12 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 244. See also Richard G. Whitman, “The neo-nor-
mative turn in theorising the EU’s international presence”, Cooperation and Conflict, 
48(2), 2013, pp. 171-193.
13 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, pp. 244-245.
14 Manners, “The normative ethics”, p. 45.
15 Manners, “Normative Power Europe”, p. 239.
16 Erik O. Eriksen, “The EU- a cosmopolitan polity?”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
13(2), 2006, p. 262.
17 Helene Sjursen, “The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be?”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13(2), 2006, p. 244.
18 Kalypso Nicolaidis and Dimitri Nicolaidis, “The EuroMed beyond Civilisational Paradig-
ms”, in Emanuel Adler, Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford and Raffaelle Del Sarto (Eds.), 
The Convergence of Civilisations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 2006, p. 348.
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Apart from that, a normative power should be perceived as ‘legitimate’ in the princi-
ples it promotes, in a fair, coherent, and consistent way.19 In other words, not only is 
normative power diffused by “living by virtuous example”20, but it also dissolves if it 
undergoes a lack of legitimacy in principles, or when it fails to secure consistency and 
coherence in its actions. Finally, and above all, considering that self-prescriptions only 
make sense when the audience buys the argument, the assessment of the observers 
also counts, both from within, and from the outside.21
3. Eurozone bailout and the NPEU hypothesis
The eruption of the Greek debt crisis in spring 2010 and the eventual contagion 
of the economic turmoil to other Eurozone members have triggered a swift change in 
the EU’s economic governance. A series of substantial reforms has been realized over 
the course of the past few years, from the ‘Euro Plus Pact’ and the ‘Fiscal Compact’, 
to the ‘Six-Pack’ and the ‘Two-pack’.22 The ultimate aim of these new rules and leg-
islations was to provide the euro area with the necessary fiscal policy convergence, 
in a way to mitigate the risk of a new financial crisis in the foreseeable future. With 
the recent reforms the EU aimed at eradicating the major flaws in the original design 
of the European Monetary Union, and thus, coming into terms with the ‘first sin’ of 
initiating the monetary union without any meaningful step towards a fiscal union. 
With the automatic sanctions mechanisms, and more effective additional supranation-
al control and monitoring mechanisms, these economic governance reforms aimed to 
bring a lasting end to the economic turmoil in the euro area. 
19 Ian Manners, “The EU’s Normative Power in Changing World Politics”, in André Gerrits 
(Ed.), Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion, Hague, Nether-
lands Institute of International Relations, 2009, p. 12.
20 Manners, “The normative ethics”, p. 56.
21 See De Zutter, “Normative power spotting”, pp. 1106-1127.
22 Approved by twenty-three EU countries in March 2011, the Euro Plus Pact is an intergo-
vernmental arrangement which requires signatory states to anchor a broad range of fis-
cal policy reforms, including pension reforms, in their national legislations. In December 
2011, the EU leaders agreed on the ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the Economic and Monetary Union’, also known as the ‘Fiscal Compact’ (signed in March 
2012). With the aim of enhancing fiscal policy supervision in the Euro area, the Fiscal 
Compact introduced an automatic sanctions mechanism to be applied to euro area member 
states failing to comply with the agreed budgetary rules. In addition to these two intergo-
vernmental agreements, the EU also realized two sets of legislative reforms. Entered into 
force in December 2011, the Six-Pack comprises five Regulations and one Directive which 
initiated a new process for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances in the 
Eurozone. Built on the Six-Pack, and adopted in May 2013, the Two-Pack aims to enhance 
fiscal policy convergence across the euro area countries, mainly by enabling the European 
Commission to issue an opinion on compliance of a draft budget prior to its submission to 
national parliaments. Both of these legislative reforms aiming at completing the structural 
reform process of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) are now part of the European Se-
mester.
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These reforms however, resulted in a considerable decay in the EU member 
states’ ability to decide on specific fiscal policy measures to support specific targets 
such as employment creation, or economic growth. Taken together, the Euro Plus 
Pact, the Fiscal Compact, the Six-Pack, and the Two-Pack thus reduced the policy 
autonomy of member states, as well as the democratic control over economic policy 
making significantly. The continuing neoliberal restructuring of the EU’s economic 
governance is stricter than the original EMU in many respects, particularly in con-
stricting the established democratic control processes over economic policy and de-
cision-making. 
On a more practical level, the EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis was to 
develop a new mechanism -- namely the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) -- by means of which a series of emer-
gency financial support measures can be provided to Eurozone member economies. 
In this new framework for emergency financial support, the EU initiated a number of 
financial assistance programmes, often referred to as EU ‘bailout packages’. These 
financial assistance programmes were jointly funded by the EU (two thirds of the 
funds) and the IMF (one third of the funds). These programmes were designed and 
managed by the ‘Troika’ -- the tripartite body composed of the European Commis-
sion, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund. With 
respect to the size of financial funds associated, the EU/IMF rescue programmes are 
larger (and in the case of Greece, significantly larger) than similar IMF stand-by deals 
signed by Turkey, Brazil, Mexico or Argentina in the previous decades.23 The terms of 
lending (i.e. the rates of interest) were typically above -- i.e. actually more favourable 
to the lender than -- those dictated by financial markets on the date of funding.24 
The EU’s preferences, quasi-legal restructuring, and changing relations with 
the crisis-hit euro area Member States in the last couple of years have strong impli-
cations for the NPEU argument. This analysis inclines us to think that the NPEU 
argument today seems to be less and less convincing, and more contested and con-
tradictory than ever. This can be seen, first and foremost, in the lack of transparency 
in the decision-making processes during the design and implementation of the EU/
IMF assistance programmes, and in the weak democratic accountability of associated 
institutions.  
The EU/IMF assistance programmes were negotiated in the name of the EU by 
the European Commission, acting “in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, 
together with the IMF”.25 The Commission’s decisions concerning the details of the 
23 Jean Pisani-Ferry et al., “EU-IMF assistance to euro-area countries: an early assessment”, 
Bruegel Blueprint Series, No. 19, 2013, p. 30.
24 Due to the insistence of European political leaders for overly strict lending criteria, credits 
to the euro area member states “could only be provided at penalty rates”, that is, at rates 
much higher than the prevailing market rate, reaching as high as 400 basis points above 
Euribor. Pisani-Ferry et al., “EU-IMF assistance to euro-area countries”, p. 67.
25 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 2012, p. 29, http://www.
eurozone.europa.eu/media/migrated/596968/treaty_establishing_the_esm_2012_final.
pdf, Accessed (18.06.2014).
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bilateral loans were declared as based on Ecofin Council recommendations, but have 
been, in practice, shaped exclusively by the Eurogroup, an informal body composed 
of euro area finance ministers.26 In all EU/IMF assistance programmes, disbursement 
of financial aid is made conditional on the fulfilment of specific criteria, which are 
subject to continual monitoring and quarterly reviews to be held by the Commission, 
and the IMF.27 The structural policy conditionality inherent in the programmes is de-
clared to be decided ‘jointly’ by the three members of the Troika. However, no further 
information about how exactly negotiations and decision-making processes are held, 
and the division of labour within the Troika, was provided.  
3.1. Lack of transparency and the problem of weak accountability 
Apart from the extremely vague agency structure, and the imprecision in the 
manner through which authority is being dispersed in the name of the Union, there 
was also a severe lack of transparency in the making and implementation of the EU/
IMF assistance programmes. The way negotiations were held in reality between the 
Troika and the relevant Member State seeking assistance, as well as the degree to 
which a crisis-hit Member State was capable of influencing negotiations, were unclear 
and lacking in transparency.28 In its resolution of 20 November 2012 the European 
Parliament called the EU institutions which are members of the Troika to secure full 
transparency, stronger democratic legitimacy, and highest standards of accountability 
at both the national and Union level29; however, no serious action for this end has 
been taken yet. The lack of transparency in the making and implementation of the 
EU/IMF programmes was of such magnitude that on 21 November 2013 the Europe-
an Parliament sent a ‘questionnaire’ to institutions involved in the Troika, and euro 
area Member States under the EU/IMF assistance programmes, in the framework of 
the drafting of an “Own initiative report evaluating the structure, the role and oper-
ations of the Troika actions in euro area programme countries”.30 On the claim that 
26 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika 
(ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries”, Com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 2014,  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2014-0149+0+DOC+PDF+V0//
EN, Accessed (18.06.2014).
27 It should be emphasized at this level of analysis that although conditionality is claimed to 
be a negotiated compromise between the Troika and Member State governments, it is an 
imposition on those latter by all means, since there was no other genuinely viable alterna-
tive for the programme countries other than bowing to the demands of the lenders to get 
access to the desperately needed funds.
28 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, p. 
5.
29 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-0430 
&language=EN, Accessed (18.06.2014).
30 European Parliament, “Questionnaire supporting the own initiative report evaluating 
the structure, the role and operations of the ‘troika’ (Commission, ECB and the IMF) 
actions in euro area programme countries”, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/docu-
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“many citizens in Europe are sensing a lack of accountability and transparency of the 
working methods of the Troika”31 the European Parliament directed 29 very specific 
questions -- plus 9 additional questions to the Member States -- in the questionnaire, 
aiming to shed more light on decision and policy-making processes, and issues of ac-
countability, as well as to uncover the principles and assumptions guiding the financial 
assistance programmes. 
The European Parliament sent the questionnaire to the IMF, the European 
Council, the European Commission, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the ministries of 
finance and central banks of Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. Responses to this 
questionnaire are quite revelatory in observing how the lack of transparency leaves 
accountability of the parties extremely blurred, making legitimacy of decisions highly 
questionable. Broadly speaking, these institutions either declined to fill in the ques-
tionnaire, denying any involvement with, or accountability for, the implementation 
of the assistance programmes altogether, or provided only incomplete answers to the 
very precise questions. In the first instance, the IMF refused to fill in the questionnaire 
and respond to the questions, claiming that it is not publicly accountable by reason of 
its statuses not permitting it to “appear formally before, or report in writing to national 
or European Parliaments”, a feature the European Parliament “regrets”.32 In a similar 
manner, the European Council also declined to fill in the European Parliament’s ques-
tionnaire, renouncing any involvement with Troika decisions and the design of the 
programmes in a letter written by Herman Van Rompuy who declared, “as President 
of the European Council, I am not involved in the interaction of these institutions with 
programme countries or in the review of their reports and assessments”.33 
The ECB, -- one of the two EU institutions within the Troika -- answered the 
questionnaire only on a selective basis, and avoided providing precise information 
regarding the criteria through which reform priorities have been identified, as well as 
about the assumptions guiding policy decisions. In regard to the very clear, technical 
question about ‘fiscal multipliers’ used to forecast debt sustainability, the ECB, for 
example, responded only by commenting that this issue has been “overly simplified”, 
while “reality is much more complicated and nuanced”.34 In response to the question 
“What was the modus operandi leading to the adoption of draft programmes?” the 
ment/activities/cont/201401/20140114ATT77313/20140114ATT77313EN.pdf, Accessed 
(18.06.2014).
31 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/subject-files.html?id=20140114C-
DT77307, Accessed (18.06.2014).
32 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, p. 
18.
33 European Council, “European Council response to the questionnaire of the European Par-
liament on the troika (Herman Van Rompuy Letter)”, 2013, http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/document/activities/cont/201401/20140114ATT77309/20140114ATT77309EN.pdf, 
Accessed (18.06.2014).
34 European Central Bank, “ECB response to the questionnaire of the European Parliament 
on the troika”, 2014, p. 2, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140110_ecb_respon-
se_troika_questionnaireen.pdf, Accessed (18.06.2014).
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ECB also gave a somewhat evasive answer, claiming that “it would be impossible to 
summarize in a few lines the extensive and detailed macroeconomic analysis” that is 
already outlined in the Memorandums of Understanding, and the periodic staff reports 
by the European Commission and the IMF.35 The ECB provided no precise informa-
tion regarding specific policies it implements under the assistance programmes, ei-
ther. With regard to its role in “imposing conditions in exchange for liquidity support” 
(question 26), the ECB provided no explanation, answering that “the ECB decides on 
its monetary policy in full independence”.36 Regarding the questions about the design 
and democratic accountability of the programmes, the ECB commented that “in terms 
of specific measures for specific countries, it would be more appropriate for the Eu-
rogroup to respond”.37 
The European Commission, while answering the more general questions in 
detail, did not to provide worthwhile clarifications about the assumptions guiding the 
economic policy conditionality of the programmes. Just like the ECB, for specific 
questions about the programme implementation, decision-making, and accountability 
issues, the Commission attributed responsibility to the Ecofin and Eurogroup in its 
responses to the questionnaire.38 The Eurogroup, on the other hand, responded to the 
29 very specific questions with a four-and-a-half page letter responding to “some of 
the broader issues raised” only, claiming that it is up to the programme countries and 
Troika institutions to provide answers, as they, “themselves are best placed to answer 
many of your specific questions”.39 The European Parliament’s attempt to overcome 
the lack of transparency surrounding the design and implementation of the euro area 
assistance programmes thus ended in a dialogue des sourds. The question of effective 
public accountability of the euro area assistance programmes remained unanswered.
3.2. ‘Informal governance’ and the problem of self-binding  
through law  
The European Parliament’s incapacity in gaining insight -- let aside in gaining 
control -- over the decision-making, and authority-dispersion processes within the 
Troika reveals one major problem with the EU’s responses to the Eurozone crisis: the 
problem of democratic control. Not only was information kept behind closed doors, 
and a genuine debate on alternative ways of coping with the crisis was blocked, but 
also democratic channels of decision-making were almost totally sidestepped in the 
making of the euro area programmes, and during the course of recent neoliberal re-
35 Ibid., p. 2.
36 Ibid., p. 10.
37 Ibid., p. 4.
38 European Commission, “European Commission response to the questionnaire of the 
European Parliament on the troika”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/
cont/201401/20140114ATT77315/20140114ATT77315EN.pdf, Accessed (18.06.2014).
39 Eurogroup, “Eurogroup response to the questionnaire of the European Parliament on the troi-
ka”, 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201401/20140114AT-
T77339/20140114ATT77339EN.pdf, Accessed (18.06.2014).
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forms. The EU’s responses are thus tainted by a strong inclination towards strength-
ening the authority of the independent, technocratic bodies of EU bureaucracy, such 
as the ECB. Meanwhile parliamentary oversight of policy-making was highly limited 
at the national level and absent at the EU level.40 In the case of Portugal, for example, 
policy conditionality of the austerity package was not even ratified by the national par-
liament. This attitude of avoiding deliberation, social dialogue and democratic control 
is a general problem faced in the implementation of the programmes, as a recent re-
port by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has revealed. In its report 
based on its affiliates’ responses to a questionnaire about the functioning of the Troi-
ka, presented at a hearing of the European Parliament on 14 February 2014, ETUC 
claimed that Troika representatives avoided dialogue with social partners, choosing to 
respond “with a ‘set response’, replying with ‘generalities’ or in an elusive way, while 
being absolute in their demands by saying “you have to do this or the other””.41 
The lack of democratic control, deliberation, and involvement of the masses 
can be best seen in the EU’s avoidance to put any of the recent decisions to a public 
referendum. In the fear of rejection, none of the recent institutional or legislative re-
forms have been put to referendum (with the exception of Irish referendum on Fiscal 
Compact), despite the fact that such major reforms in European integration require 
treaty revisions, which, in turn, need to be ratified either by parliamentary votes or ref-
erendums.42 The EU political leaders were ‘wise enough’ to take the necessary lesson 
from the French, Dutch and Irish ‘No’ to the European Constitution; considering that 
what motivated the French No were people’s concerns with the ‘Bolkestein directive’, 
and ‘the too excessive neoliberalism embedded in the European Constitution’. The 
avoidance of referendums and delegation of authority to weakly accountable, ‘tech-
nocratic’ institutions have been successful in effectively restraining democratic con-
testation of neoliberal austerity policies during the past few years.43 These strategies 
the EU adopted in times of an emergency, however, have produced inconsistency in 
the pursuit of norms, and problems of democratic legitimacy, all undermining the truth 
claims of the EU’s normative power. 
Actually, it can be admitted that in the face of the Eurozone crisis the EU had 
a serious difficulty of self-binding through law, and failed to fully respect the estab-
lished rules, procedures and modalities. In a chain of instances when responding to 
the financial turmoil in the euro area the EU sidestepped the agreed legal norms and 
the existing procedures and conventions of the Union. These practices have impor-
tant implications for the EU’s normative power, since self-binding through law is a 
strong indicator of normative power. As Sjursen correctly points out, it is self-binding 
through law which would “ensure consistency in the application and pursuit of nor-
40 Henk Overbeek, “Sovereign Debt Crisis in Euroland: Root Causes and Implications for 
European Integration”, International Spectator, 47(1), 2012, pp. 44-45.
41 ETUC, “The Functioning of the Troika: A Report from the ETUC”, European Trade 
Union Confederation, Brussels, 2014, p. 4. 
42 Frank Schimmelfennig, “European Integration in the Euro Crisis: The Limits of Postfunc-
tionalism”, Journal of European Integration, 36(3), 2014, p. 333. 
43 Schimmelfennig, “European Integration in the Euro Crisis”, pp. 333-334
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ms”.44 The NPEU argument requires legal commitments be respected consistently at 
all times, (including times of crisis and distress) as this is what brings legitimacy of 
actions.
In the first instance, delegation of power to supranational institutions such as 
the Commission and the ECB involved a series of breaches of the agreed legal norms, 
and established procedures, of the Union. The very participation of the ECB in the 
decision-making processes related to ‘budgetary’, ‘fiscal’, and ‘macroeconomic’ pol-
icies of programme countries as a member of the Troika is the most widely assert-
ed breach of the EU’s legal norms.45 This is primarily because the ECB needed an 
“informal expansion” of its mandates in order to be able to adopt such a function in 
the bailout programmes.46 The present function of the ECB within the Troika goes 
definitely beyond the agreed legal norms constitutive of the EMU, since the ECB’s 
mandate is confined by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
to ‘monetary policy’, and ‘financial stability’ exclusively.47 Similarly, the Commis-
sion’s involvement in the Troika is also in close contradiction with its “normal role, 
which is to act as an independent principal protecting the EU interest and ensuring 
the implementation of EU rules within the limits established by the Treaties”.48 Fur-
thermore, as highlighted by the European Parliament, the Commission has no legal 
competence in participating in decision making processes in Member States’ wages, 
pensions, or social policy.49 Thus, by taking an active part in the design and execution 
of austerity measures forced upon Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus, the ECB 
and the Commission went far beyond their duties and responsibilities specified in the 
existing legal structure of the EU. The assertion of EU-level executive power by the 
Eurogroup, which is an informal body whose role is not specified in EU’s primary law 
is just another clear breach of the agreed legal norms and rules of the Union.50 
A major reason for why the EU failed in so many instances of self-binding 
through law is the absence of an appropriate legal basis, in the absence of which, 
most of the change has to be accomplished outside the main body of EU primary law, 
controverting established practices, and principles grounded in the acquis communau-
44 Sjursen, “The EU as a ‘normative” power’”, p. 244.
45 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, p. 
17.
46 See Schimmelfennig, “European Integration in the Euro Crisis”, p. 335.
47 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, p. 
17.
48 Ibid., p. 17.
49 Ibid., p. 17.
50 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, 
p. 16. Also see Ioannis Katsaroumpas, “EU Bailout Conditionality as a De Facto Mode of 
Government: A Neoliberal ‘Black Hole’ for the Greek Collective Labour Law System?”, 
Labour Law Research Conference, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, 13-15 June 
2013, http://www.upf.edu/gredtiss/_pdf/2013-LLRNConf_Katsaroumpas.pdf, Accessed 
(18.06.2014).
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taire. It can be said that the EU was somewhat obliged to search for -- and actually 
succeeded in -- finding new, innovative ways through which it can collaborate with 
the IMF for setting up the euro area rescue packages. Contrary to what would be 
expected from a normative power, however, ‘informal’ governance has become more 
than an exception but a rule during the Eurozone crisis, making the decision-making 
processes increasingly blurred, resulting in democratic accountability and legitimacy 
problems. 
The prevalence of informal governance is performed by a strategy of combin-
ing ‘hard law’ with ‘soft law’, and ‘constitutionalism’ with ‘bilateralism/intergover-
mentalism’. This new mode of governance of the EU does not present an example of 
genuinely ‘deliberative’ form of intergovernmentalism, or ‘deliberative intergovern-
mentalism’ as suggested by Puetter51, either. This is because ‘deliberation’ necessi-
tates an open debate, devoid of hierarchical power relations. It is extremely difficult 
to claim that such a deliberative process has taken place in the present case, not only 
because of the lack of transparency and inadequate flow of information, or because 
of the denial of accountability -- and responsibility -- by the Troika institutions, but 
also because of the domination of political debates and decision-making processes 
by the larger, wealthier, and economically more powerful Member States. The Euro 
area programmes, and current restructuring in the EU’s economic governance were 
led, and dominated by these larger, ‘core’ members of the EU, and in all these recent 
developments “the voices of the southern, smaller members are not heeded, contrary 
to what would be expected in a post-national polity”.52 
4. On the EU’s ability of changing norms, standards and prescriptions: 
whose norms and values are these after all?
Loan or policy conditionality is by far the most salient feature of the EU/IMF 
assistance programmes, which started prior to the very first disbursement of financial 
support in all cases.53 Conditionality regime of the EU/IMF assistance programmes 
has strong implications for the NPEU argument. This is primarily because policy 
conditionality is a transference of norms, values and idea(l)s, and also of a partic-
ular ideology. In this sense, conditionality regime of the assistance programmes is 
very similar to the EU’s own ‘democratic conditionality’ imposed on accession coun-
51 Uwe Puetter, “Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Council and 
European Council in EU economic governance”, Journal of European Public Policy, 
19(2), 2012, pp. 161-178.
52 Beyza Ç. Tekin, “Rethinking the Post-National EU in Times of Austerity and Crisis”, 
Mediterranean Politics, 19(1), 2014, p. 35.
53 In the case of Greece, programme conditionality even involved EU (and IMF) demands 
for political arrangements to seek control over election results to secure the adjustment 
programmes. All the major political parties were forced to sign a letter confirming that they 
will respect the policy conditionality regime of the proposed programme, on the eve of the 
May 2012 general elections in Greece. See Leigh Phillips, “Future Greek governments 
must be bound to austerity strategy”, EUobserver, 21 November 2011, https://euobserver.
com/economic/114344, Accessed (18.06.2014).
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tries.54 It is therefore crucial to understand which particular set of norms and values 
are transferred somewhat forcibly under the stringent loan conditionality regime of 
the EU/IMF assistance programmes. Only after such an inquiry can it be possible to 
critically assess the EU’s distinctive ability to set norms, standards and prescriptions 
-- one of the core claims of the normative power Europe argument. 
Structurally, the EU/IMF assistance programmes are enacted in the very same 
way of a typical IMF stand-by agreement, i.e. they all started by a ‘Letter of Intent’ 
and a Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) submitted to the 
IMF by the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank of the borrower 
country, summarising the present state of the economic and financial conditions, and 
the urgent needs of the economy, as well as drawing the contours of the structural and 
economic policy measures to be implemented if financial support is secured. These 
documents do not only institute in legal terms an economic relation and a distinct 
conditionality relation simultaneously55, but they also tell us much about the ‘superi-
or’ economic policy vision the creditor countries dictate on the programme countries. 
In that sense, the policy conditionality forms a hierarchy of economic policy visions 
and norms, between those recommended by the Troika, and the ones which have been 
already at use in programme countries, decided as a result of the relevant national 
democratic processes. 
In the EU/IMF assistance programmes the disbursement of credit tranches is 
made conditional on the adoption of a set of very detailed economic policies and 
structural reforms, framed as ‘indispensable’ for the attainment of specific macro-
economic objectives. In this conditionality regime, specific performance criteria, 
economic policies, and benchmark structural reforms are defined in an exhaustive 
manner, and loan-receiving country governments are provided with a rigid timetable 
for meeting these targets before the specified deadlines.56 Here, it should be noted 
that the loan conditionality inscribed in the above documents corresponds to the more 
stringent form of conditionality regimes implemented under typical IMF stand-by 
agreements.57 
54 For a detailed analysis of the EU bailout conditionality, see Katsaroumpas, “EU Bailout 
Conditionality”, pp. 1-41. For a discussion of how a set of specific norms and values are 
transferred under the EU democratic conditionality, see Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, “Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 11(4), 2004, pp. 661-
679.
55 Katsaroumpas, “EU Bailout Conditionality”, p. 4.
56 For a detailed analysis of this ‘policy-based’ conditionality approach, see Mohsin S. Khan 
and Sunil Sharma, “IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs”, IMF Wor-
king Paper No. 01/142, IMF Institute, 2001, pp. 23-25.
57 Here, it is important to note that ‘strict’ conditionality is demanded by the EU, rather than 
the IMF, based on the former’s presumption that the legitimacy of any EU bailout in the 
euro area can be secured if, and only if, strict conditionality is enforced. See Philomila 
Tsoukala, “Narratives of the European Crisis and the Future of (Social) Europe”, Texas 
International Law Journal, 48(2), 2013, p. 253. 
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The EU/IMF assistance programmes indicate remarkable rhetorical, and mac-
roeconomic, and structural policy continuity with the previous IMF stand-by agree-
ments. In each of the programmes loan conditionality limited the policy space substan-
tially, demanding stringent fiscal consolidation, drastic cuts in social benefits and ser-
vices, including pensions, along with restrictive wage policies and neoliberal reforms 
in national pension and collective wage bargaining systems, and in state structure. Ex-
pansive deregulation in the labour market and in the provision of health and education 
services, public expenditure re-prioritization, and mass privatisation were among the 
other main elements of the conditionality regime of the euro area programmes. These 
policies and reforms correspond to a particular set of neoliberal policy prescriptions 
often referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’, a policy straightjacket which has 
long been widely criticised in development economics with regard to its ineffective-
ness in promoting sustainable development and growth, and for deteriorating social 
texture and undermining country ownership of adjustment programs.58 Despite the 
fact that as a result of growing criticism an adjusted version of this neoliberal policy 
vision has come to be seriously considered, however, no significant departure from the 
older paradigm of the Washington Consensus can be observed in the case of the EU/
IMF assistance programmes.59 This is because no, or just too little attention has been 
paid for easing the detrimental economic and social effects of extreme austerity mea-
sures.60 Likewise, poverty and inequality issues were simply hardly mentioned in any 
of the Memorandums of Understanding or other assistance programme documents.61 
Poverty alleviation was not made part of any of the EU/IMF assistance programmes, 
and no poverty reduction mechanisms were foreseen (perhaps, to some extent, with 
the exception of the Greek programme).62  
58 For this particular economic policy vision and norms emanating from the Washington-ba-
sed international financial institutions, see John Williamson, “What Washington Means by 
Policy Reform,” in J. Williamson (Ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has 
Happened?, Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1990, pp. 5-38 and John 
Williamson “Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus’”, World Development, 21(8), 
1993, pp. 1329-1336.
59 Often referred to as the ‘augmented’, or ‘post-’ Washington Consensus, the adjusted ver-
sion refers to a set of second generation neoliberal reforms which aims to mitigate the 
deteriorating impact of structural adjustment programmes on the weaker members of the 
society, placing more emphasis on poverty alleviation, and inequality reduction, through 
targeted poverty reduction schemes, and social safety nets. See Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye 
Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s 
Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform”, Journal of Econo-
mic Literature, 44(4), 2006, pp. 973-987.
60 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, p. 
15.
61 See André Sapir et al., “The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area: successes and 
failures”, European Parliament, Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee Study, 
PE 497.764, February 2014, p. 6.
62 Sapir et al., The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area”, p. 17-18. 
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On balance, the very same ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach of the standard IMF 
structural adjustment programmes has been reproduced. Extreme austerity measures 
are framed as bitter medicine compulsory to cure the sickness. In the ‘selling’ of the 
programmes, in their public statements and interviews, Troika officials employed the 
same rhetoric in which ‘competitiveness’ and the purest neoliberal prescriptions of the 
Washington Consensus are marketed as a cure-all medicine, for all, and every problem, 
in the euro area. Discourses of the ‘primacy of the market’ and ‘market imperatives’, 
as well as ‘restitution of competitiveness’, and ‘efficiency at all cost’, came forth with 
an unprecedented fervour, undermining the idea of a Delorsian ‘Social Europe’. 
Most of these specific economic policy recommendations and structural re-
forms are difficult to fit in the NPEU argument. This is primarily because a genuine 
social solidarity has not been achieved, not only because of the loan conditionality, 
strict monitoring, excessive austerity demands, and the ‘penalty’ terms of lending, 
but also because “the burden has not been shared among all who acted irresponsibly 
and that the protection of bondholders was seen as an EU necessity in the interests of 
financial stability”.63 Restrictive wage policies and decentralisation of collective bar-
gaining were by far the most controversial measures projected by the Troika, as these 
resulted in the suspension of the interests of the working classes in a direct and un-
precedented way.64 These policies dictated by the Troika are widely criticized as open 
breaches of the EU’s agreed legal norms, and constitutive norms, values, and prin-
ciples. The European Trade Union Confederation criticized the too-restrictive wage 
policies and decentralization in collective bargaining for having significantly limited 
the autonomy of trade unions to negotiate wages, and declared these measures as not 
fitting well with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.65 On November 2012, the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association crit-
icized the widespread deficit of social dialogue in Greece, and declared that the new 
procedures favouring decentralized bargaining represent “a weakening of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining contrary to the principles of Conventions Nos 
87 and 98”.66 The Committee also called the Greek government to review, without 
delay, and in dialogue with the social partners, the application of new procedures such 
as the special sub-minima wages for young workers and the long-term unemployed.67 
A decision by the European Social Committee of the European Social Charter 
also condemned the minimum wage arrangements and restrictive wage policies of the 
63 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, p. 
20.
64 These measures go from the 1 euro reduction in the hourly minimum wages in Ireland, 
to differential minimum wage reductions, forced early retirement, and a full-blown dis-
mantling of the collective bargaining, and unemployment and labour protection system in 
Greece. See Sapir et al., “The Troika and financial assistance in the euro area”, pp. 1-87.
65 ETUC, “The Functioning of the Troika”, pp. 2-10.
66 ILO, “365th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association-Case No. 2820”, Inter-
national Labour Office, Geneva, 2012, p. 272.
67 Ibid., p. 270.
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Greek programme as “discriminatory on basis of age and thus violating the non-dis-
crimination clause in the Preamble of European Social Charter”.68 These criticisms 
were so widely pronounced both from the outside, and within the EU that the Europe-
an Parliament called Troika to ensure that the programmes fully conform to: 
“[…] the objectives of the European Union, i.e. the promotion 
of employment and improved living and working conditions, so as to 
make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
maintained, as well as proper social protection, dialogue between man-
agement and labour, the development of human resources with a view 
to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion, as stated in 
Article 151 TFEU”.69
The European Parliament has also criticized health system reforms and cuts 
in social benefits in programme countries for harming people’s access to basic health 
services, and thus for violating the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, or the 
provisions of the constitutive Treaties, especially Article 168 (7) of the TFEU .70 
5. Conclusion
After a five year long disappointing history of neoliberal austerity, continuing 
restructuring in the EU’s economic governance and the Troika regime, serious ques-
tions of democratic accountability, transparency, solidarity, and deliberative democ-
racy have been raised. The strict conditionality of the bailout agreements has clearly 
shown that the EU/IMF programmes were ‘business as usual’, rather than genuinely 
‘European’ or ‘Cosmopolitan’ acts of solidarity. While the Troika involved in disin-
tegrating what has remained from ‘Social Europe’, neither the European Parliament, 
nor the European Court of Justice, or any other supranational, or national institution 
could secure deliberative democracy, democratic control and accountability, and le-
gitimacy of decision-making procedures. They all failed utterly; just like democratic 
control mechanisms failed before elsewhere, in the ‘developing world’, when faced 
with similar policy conditionality and neoliberal reforms. 
The crisis helped those observers of the European Union, both from within, 
and from the outside, to see ‘the emperor’s new clothes’, the naked truth that the EU 
lacks the ideational capacity to offer a viable alternative to globalization. The EU did 
not only give a kiss of life to the wobbling ‘Washington Consensus’, but also seriously 
deteriorated its self-image of a shelter to its members in the face of American-style, 
deregulated, ‘savage’ capitalism. The European rescue plan has shown us that an al-
ternative, EU-style ‘managed globalization’ simply does not exist, nowhere other than 
in the discourses of European political elites. In the past few years, the Troika regime 
in the euro area explicitly declared all policy alternatives to neoliberalism irrational, 
68 Katsaroumpas, “EU Bailout Conditionality”, p. 30.
69 European Parliament, “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika”, p. 
20.
70 Ibid., p. 12.
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almost illegal, insisting that there can’t be any credible alternative to neoliberal aus-
terity and reforms. 
This study of the EU’s preferences, and actions, during the Eurozone crisis 
shows that the new design of the EMU, following the recent institutional reforms, 
legal modifications and informal structures, clearly contradicts many principles of 
the concept of normative power Europe. EU’s responses in the face of crisis do not 
reflect what the EU has promised to its citizens, the creation of an alternative form of 
polity capable of dealing with negative effects of neoliberal globalism. Today, the EU 
is not convincing in its claim to challenge deregulated globalisation and the NPEU 
argument seems contradictory and contested. 
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